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GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL OF RETROACTIVE HEPATITIS B VACCINATION IN CHINA
Ali Chouhan1, Sohail Maiwand2, Matthew Ngo1, Vooha Putalapattu3
1Department of Biology, 2Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, 3Department of Psychology
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284, USA
Introduction
• Hepatitis B (HepB) is one of the most common infectious diseases affecting
over two billion people worldwide. One third of all HepB cases are in China.
• China made significant efforts to implement a nationwide HepB vaccination
program and reduced the number of unvaccinated infants from 30% to 10%.
However, many individuals still remain unprotected, particularly those born
before 2003.
• A catch-up retroactive vaccination is an important and especially cost-
effective way to reduce HepB prevalence .
• We analyze a game theoretical model of HepB dynamics that incorporates
government-provided vaccination at birth coupled with voluntary retroactive
vaccinations.
HepB overview
• HepB is transmitted through contact with infected bodily fluids such as
blood, semen and saliva.
• The transmission can occur during childbirth, blood transfusion, dialysis,
sharing of needle sticks, or sexual contact. In China, transmission of HepB
from carrier mothers to their babies is most common.
• HepB incubation period is 60-120 days.
• An acute HepB infection lasts less than 6 months.
• There is no specific treatment for acute HepB.
• It can develop into chronic liver infection causing cirrhosis or liver cancer.
• About 10-40% of chronic HepB cases require treatment by oral antiviral
agents. Almost 28 million patients in China require treatment, however,
less than 2% receive it.
Scheme of HepB transmission
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Fig. 1: Susceptible (S), Latent infections (L), Acute infections (I), Chronic carriers (C), Recovered (R), Vaccinated (V ).
The rates are explained in Table 1.
ODE model of HepB transmission
dS
dt
= µω(1− vC) + ψV − S(µ0 + γ3 + βI + βC)
dV
dt
= µ(1− ω) + γ3S − V (µ0 + ψ)
dL
dt
= (βI + βC)S − L(µ0 + σ)
dI
dt
= σL− I(µ0 + γ1)
dR
dt
= (1− q)γ1I + γ2C −Rµ0
dC
dt
= qγ1I + µωrC − C(µ0 + µ1 + γ2)
Symbol Meaning Base value
µ Birth rate 0.0119 per year
µ0 Natural mortality rate 1/76 per year
µ1 HepB related mortality rate 7.6× 10−5 per year
β Effective transmission rate 10 per year
 Reduction factor for transmission from carriers 0.16
σ Incubation rate 3 per year
γ1 Recovery rate from acute infection 4 per year
γ2 Recovery rate from chronic infection 0.025 per year
γ3 Retroactive vaccination rate ≥ 0 per year
ω Proportion of unvaccinated infants 0.1 per year
q Probability of chronic infection 0.04
ψ Vaccine waning rate 0.1 per year
v Probability of perinatal infection 0.11
CI Cost of acute infection $300
CC Cost of chronic infection $40000
Cvaccine Cost of HepB vaccination $3
Table 1: Parameters of HepB dynamics.
Results - Equilibria
The disease free equilibrium E0 = (S0, 0, 0, 0, 0, V0) where
S0 =
µ
µ0
· µ0ω + ψ
µ0 + γ3 + ψ
V0 =
µ
µ0
· µ0 + γ3 − µ0ω
µ0 + γ3 + ψ
is stable when
R0 = β
µ
µ0
· µ0ω + ψ
µ0 + γ3 + ψ
· 1
µ0 + γ1
· σ
µ0 + σ
[
1 +
qγ1
µ0 + µ1 + γ2 − µωv
]
< 1
and the endemic equilibrium E∗ = (S∗, L∗, I∗, C∗, R∗, V ∗) where
S∗ = µ0 + σ
σ
µ0 + γ0
β
(
1 +  qγ1µ0+µ1+γ2−µωv
)
V ∗ = µ(1− ω) + γ3S
∗
µ0 + ψ
I∗ = µω + ψV
∗ − S∗(µ0 + γ3)
µωv qγ1µ0+µ1+γ2−µωv + βS
∗ + β qγ1µ0+µ1+γ2−µωvS
∗
L∗ = µ0 + γ1
σ
I∗
C∗ = qγ1I
∗
µ0 + µ1 + γ2 − µωv
R∗ = (1− q)γ1I
∗ + γ2C∗
µ0
.
is stable when R0 > 1.
Results - Herd immunity and Nash equilibrium
The population reaches herd immunity when the retroactive vaccination rate is
γ3,HI = β
µ
µ0
· (µ0ω + ψ) ·
1
µ0 + γ1
· σ
µ0 + σ
[
1 +
qγ1
µ0 + µ1 + γ2 − µωv
]
− (µ0 + ψ).
The Nash equilibrium vaccination rate, γ3,NE is given as a solution to
γ3,NE =
√
µ0ψCnotV (γ3,NE)− ψ,
where
CnotV (γ3) = P (S → L)P (L→ I)
(
CI + P (I → C)CC
)
=
βIe + βCe
βIe + βCeµ0
σ
σ + µ0
(
CI +
qγ1
µ0 + γ1
CC
)
.
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Fig. 2: The optimal vaccination rate γ3,p as it depends on the vaccination rate in the population. The point of intersection
is the point of Nash equilibrium. The herd immunity is achieved when the optimal vaccination rate reaches 0.
Conclusions
• A free, nationwide catch-up vaccination program for children and adoles-
cents in China is likely to be cost-saving and feasible.
• The herd immunity and the Nash equilibrium retroactive vaccination rates
do not depend too much on the percentage of unvaccinated infants. This
independence is caused by the relatively large vaccine waning rate.
• The retroactive (and repeated) vaccination is a necessary component of
the HepB reduction and eradication efforts.
• There is a large difference between herd immunity and Nash equilibrium
rates. The Nash equilibrium rates are in line with the vaccine waning rate;
but the herd immunity rates are about 2.5 times larger.
• It is of interest to identify and evaluate other preventative measures such as
behavioral modification that would have a measurable effect on the trans-
mission of HepB.
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